Despite extensive use of housing data to reveal valuation of non-market goods, the process of house price capitalization remains vague. Using the restricted access American Housing Survey, a high-frequency panel of prices, turnover, and occupant characteristics, this paper examines the time path of capitalization and preference-based sorting in response to air quality changes caused by differential regulatory pressure from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The results demonstrate that owner-occupied units capitalize changes immediately, whereas rent capitalization lags. The delayed but sharp rent capitalization temporally coincides with evidence of sorting, suggesting a strong link between location choices and price dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
Charles Tiebout (1956) argued that households should "vote with their feet" and choose residential locations with the optimal bundle of amenities and price. Since that time, and especially after Rosen's (1974) formal development of hedonic theory, economists have exploited housing market data to uncover people's preferences and values for a wide range of spatially delineated non-market goods including school quality, crime, and air pollution. When amenity levels are constant, the compensating differential in housing prices across locations should accurately reflect the value of amenity differences, such that the marginal mover is indifferent between locations.
However, our understanding of how prices and households dynamically respond to a change in amenity levels is limited. Rosen's model assumes costless relocation and thus immediate and full price capitalization, and this assumption is implicit in most empirical applications. However, if this assumption is false, estimates of the amenity value could be biased as a result of too short of a study time span. Further, too long of a time span may also produce biased estimates if important determinants of house prices, which change on the time span of a decade but not one or two years, are unobserved. This paper addresses these dynamic extensions of Tiebout's ideas in the context of large improvements in air quality that occurred during the 1990s. Specifically, I examine the path of prices for both owners and renters that capitalize a change in air quality -going beyond if prices change to how prices change. Further, I analyze preference-based sorting in response to air quality changes and seek to understand the links between sorting behavior and the dynamics of capitalization. For example, after air quality has improved a new type of resident with more money or different preferences may move in, driving up prices and displacing the old type of resident.
To address these questions, I utilize the American Housing Survey (AHS), which collects information from a nationally representative panel of housing units and their occupants every two years, including self-reported home value or rent. The high frequency and regularity of observations is essential for examination of the dynamics of capitalization and sorting.
1 I match housing units from the AHS to particulate matter (PM 10 ) concentrations measured from nearby air quality monitors. I exploit the structure of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) to identify quasi-exogenous variation in PM 10 . Similar to the seminal work of Chay and Greenstone (2005) , I employ an Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy that relies on non-attainment designations of the air quality standards to address the endogenous relationship between air quality and housing prices.
Importantly, I gained access to the confidential version of the AHS through a Census
Restricted Data Center. Unlike the public use AHS, which only identifies the geographic location of a housing unit at the MSA level, the confidential version identifies the census tract where each unit is located. This fine scale enables two critical aspects of the present research. First, the air quality that a given household faces can be measured with far greater precision. Second, the IV identification strategy can exploit localized air quality regulation intensity (which would be masked at the MSA level) stemming from within-county differential regulatory pressure. Auffhammer et al. (2009) show that within-county regulation is the principal factor determining reductions in PM 10 , and Bento et al. (2012) use these insights to construct instruments similar to those I use in this paper.
The results suggest that while both owners and renters value air quality, the path of capitalization markedly differs. Owner-occupied housing units capitalize changes in air quality immediately, and capitalization rates and marginal willingness-to-pay estimates (MWTP) stay fairly constant across time, lending credence to the hedonic method. On the other hand, renteroccupied housing units show statistically insignificant and economically small capitalization rates shortly after air quality changes, but the estimated valuation sharply increases at a lag of six years and continues to increase after that. Ten years after air quality began to change, estimated capitalization rates and MWTP are comparable to the owner-occupied units. This suite of results holds when just looking at movers or non-movers separately, excluding rent-controlled units, and several other robustness specifications. The results support the idea that the owner and renter market are fairly distinct, likely due to dramatic differences in the occupants and housing stock, which is documented by Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) and in this paper using the AHS. The sales model can exclude as much as 97% of observations (Case and Quigley 1991) . Further, transacting properties are not random; Case, Pollakowski, and Wachter (1997) show that properties that transact more tend to appreciate more, as well as have different structural characteristics. Appreciation estimates from the AHS will not have this same bias since all units report price changes, not just those that sell, and the units are randomly sampled. different patterns of capitalization lead to arbitrage opportunities between the owner and renter market purely based on air quality. However, at a maximum the disparity in annual housing costs is only $124, which is unlikely to be enough for households to delay home purchase and certainly not enough to cover the financial costs of selling a home in order to be a renter.
The striking dynamics observed in the rental market offer an excellent opportunity to examine the interplay between valuation and preference-based sorting. I analyze changes in turnover and demographic variables related to age, race, education, and income in response to changes in air quality. The results suggest that neighborhoods that experience improvements in air quality see an increase in the turnover frequency and the likelihood of families with children moving in relative to other neighborhoods, but only at a lag of six or more years. In sum, the results indicate a temporal correspondence between capitalization and preference-based sorting and offer a strong empirical confirmation of Tiebout's ideas.
There are three main contributions of this paper. The first is to shed new light on how housing prices respond to a change in amenity levels. Despite extensive use of hedonic valuation, only one paper to date has addressed the dynamic details of capitalization. Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) Grainger (2012) , who assesses the distributional impacts of the 1990 CAAA in terms of gains for owners versus renters, and Davis (2011) , who examines capitalization of new power 2 Pope (2008) is an additional paper that examines the responsiveness of house prices. In his setting it is not amenity levels that change but information about the amenity, and he finds prices are quick to respond to the new information.
plants. Both papers find that rental prices are responsive to amenity changes, but less so than their owner-occupied counterparts. However, both papers use decennial census data, and thus only address differences in levels of capitalization, whereas I employ the high frequency AHS to investigate differences in patterns of capitalization.
Third, this paper complements prior work that examined preference-based sorting (see Cameron and McConnaha (2006) and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) in response to Superfund cleanups; Bayer et al. (2007) and Cellini et al. (2010) The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the setting in which I examine capitalization patterns, namely the CAAA and particulate matter. Section 3 discusses data. I explain the use of the CAAA as a quasi-experiment in Section 4, and discuss the empirical models in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 present the capitalization results and the sorting results, respectively. Section 8 discusses the results and concludes.
PARTICULATE MATTER AND THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
Particulate matter is a class of solid and liquid air pollutants that consists of nitrates, organic chemicals, metals, soot, smoke, and dust. Particulate matter enters the atmosphere either directly from a source, such as construction sites, unpaved roads, fields, smokestacks or fires, or indirectly as the result of reactions from sulfur dioxides and nitrogen oxides that are emitted from power plants, industrial facilities, or motor vehicles (Unites States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] 2010). In general, the contribution of indirect sources is substantially larger to overall particulate matter concentrations than the contribution of direct sources.
Particulate matter is classified by the measurement of its diameter, with the diameter being inversely related to the potential for human health damage. PM 10 , the pollutant of interest in this paper, is particulate matter that is less than 10 micrometers in diameter. At this diameter, particulate matter can penetrate deeply into the human respiratory system and cause numerous health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, and even premature death for those with pre-existing lung and heart problems (EPA 2010).
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Responding to calls to action and mounting scientific evidence, the United States
Congress passed the 1970 CAA, which was the first federal legislation establishing air quality control. 4 The 1970 CAA created the EPA and authorized it to enforce National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six common air pollutants, the so-called criteria pollutants.
Particulate matter was included in this group in the form of total suspended particulates, or TSPs, which is particulate matter of diameter 100 micrometers or less. The 1990 CAAA, the second major update of the CAA, replaced TSPs with PM 10 to parallel current scientific understanding of pollution's effects. 5 In 1997, the EPA further refined the NAAQS to target PM 2.5 , again reflecting current understanding. 1996 , Becker and Henderson 2002 , Hanna 2010 ) and health outcomes Greenstone 2003, Currie and Neidell 2005) .
DATA
This section discusses the source and relevant features of the air quality data, regulatory data, housing data (including how local house price trends are managed), neighborhood data, and county economic activity data. The Data Appendix provides a complete listing of all variables used in the regression analysis.
Air quality data
Individual air quality monitor records were obtained from the Air Quality Standards (AQS) database (EPA 2009 Unlike the public use version, the restricted access AHS records the census tract where each unit is located. Using GIS, I determined the distance between each tract's geographic center, or centroid, and surrounding air quality monitors. I was then able to match housing units to air quality monitors on the basis of least distance, while excluding all unit-monitor matches that are greater than three miles apart. As units get further away from monitors, more measurement error is introduced into the key air quality variable. Additionally, Bento et al. (2012) find that valuation declines as distance from monitors increases. Thus, a three mile cutoff is used to balance measurement error and valuation concerns with sample size concerns.
Additional details about the matching process will follow in Section 5, which describes the specifics of the empirical approach.
The first two columns of Table 1 provide summary statistics examining the differences between included versus excluded housing units and their occupants for owners and renters separately. 8 Primarily reflecting the propensity of air quality monitors to be placed in urban areas, the two samples are substantially different. Included units are worth less, rent for less, are more often renter occupied, are smaller, and are less likely to have appliances. The occupants of 8 In addition to the sample restrictions based on distance to a monitor, I exclude unit-year observations when prices are interpolated/"hot decked" or error coded. Further, prices are edited if they are obviously miscoded by omission or insertion of a digit. For instance, if a unit's price sequence is $100,000, $10,000, $100,000, then the middle price would be changed to $100,000 as it appears a zero was omitted. After editing prices, I exclude units whose prices change by a factor of four in a two-year interval. Lastly, I omit unit-intervals that do not have a continuous sequence of valid observations for all years in that interval.
included units are more likely to be elderly, more likely to be Black or Hispanic, and less likely to be a high school graduate. Given these disparities, results may not extend to the entire population.
A major theme of this paper is disparities between the owner and renter market. Column 3 of Table 1 compares owners to renters for the included sample and shows that the units themselves as well as the occupants differ dramatically between the two groups. One of the starkest differences is in the turnover rate, where renter units were 32% more likely (40% compared to 8%) to turn over between 1987 and 1989. Intuitively, the fluidity of the renter market may cause rental prices to respond faster to changes in amenities than owner prices, but this is of course not the only difference between the two markets. Owner-occupied units are on average nearly 1000 square feet larger, have 1.2 more bedrooms, have 0.5 more bathrooms, and are 30% more likely to have a dishwasher and 20% more likely to have an air conditioner than renter-occupied units. Owner households make on average $17,750 more in income and are 20% less likely to be a minority than renter households. These substantial differences are especially remarkable given that all included units are located in primarily urban areas and that, in general, much of the difference between the owner and renter market stems from the fact that most rental units are in the urban core and owner-occupied units are often in the suburbs. These differences reinforce the motivation for estimating all models separately for owner-occupied and renteroccupied units.
Local housing market trends
Because the scope of the study is national and thus compares appreciation rates across many cities and regions, it is necessary to control for local housing market trends. If regional house price trends are correlated with patterns of air quality improvements, the valuation estimates could reflect those trends instead of responses to air quality changes. I institute a novel method that controls for local housing market trends by using external data. Freddie 
County economic characteristics
The correlation between air pollution and economic activity can confound the analysis of how households value air quality. While households value clean air, they also value jobs and income (and probably much more so). The IV strategy discussed in the next section is designed to eliminate the bias that arises from this correlation. But additionally, I control for county economic characteristics to mitigate this bias. From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I
use annual average county income, and I include employment data from the County Business Patterns (CBP) database. CBP gives yearly employment counts broken down by Standard Industrial Classification/North American Industry Classification System codes for each county.
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I aggregate the number of jobs into five major categories that are intended to be most relevant to air quality: construction, manufacturing, mining, agriculture/forestry, and a catch all for the remaining codes.
THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT
Empirical estimates of the true relationship between air quality and housing prices are obscured by a suite of unobserved factors that simultaneously influence both air quality and housing prices. For example, a recently built highway may worsen local air quality but increase local house prices, or the shutdown of a manufacturing plant may improve local air quality but decrease local house prices. Such correlations, which we generally expect to bias the estimated valuation of air quality toward zero, are at the root of the endogeneity problem that calls for an instrumental variable strategy. My approach treats the 1990 CAAA as a quasi-experiment to address the unobserved factors that affect both housing prices and pollution.
My identification strategy stems from that of Chay and Greenstone (2005) PM 10 compared to county in-attainment monitors, the differential is small and the trends are graphically very similar. Figure 1 suggests that the non-attainment status for monitors is strongly correlated with PM 10 reductions, but that non-attainment status for counties only weakly so.
Also, Figure 1 demonstrates that the majority of air quality improvements occurred early in the decade; 80% of total PM 10 reductions observed for non-attainment monitors had occurred by 1992.
Next consider the relationship between attainment designation and housing unit and occupant characteristics. Similar to Cellini et al. (2010) , Columns 4 and 5 of My IV approach relies on the assumption that, conditional on other observable housing, neighborhood, and county characteristics, nonattainment status only affects house prices through its impact on local pollution levels. One concern with this assumption is that the CAAA regulation affects the local economy, and thus indirectly affects home prices. In fact, a substantial body of research has shown that air quality regulation has a significant effect deterring new firms (Becker and Henderson 2000) , off-shoring production (Hanna 2010) , and on employment levels (Kahn and Mansur 2010, Walker 2011 ). However, these findings focus on the economic decisions and outcomes of polluting firms only, which represent a relatively small portion of the total economic activity of an area.
To get a sense of the impact of regulation on the overall economic robustness of an area, I analyzed the effect of individual monitor exceedences, as well as the EPA county level attainment designation, on annual measures of county average income, population, and total employment. The results, detailed in the Online Appendix, show that both non-attainment measures have an insignificant effect on the three economic measures considered, which is consistent with the ambiguous total impact of non-attainment status found by Kahn and Mansur (see their Table 5 ). While this analysis is limited, it gives no reason to think that the IV exclusion restriction is violated.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, I outline the econometric approach I use to estimate the capitalization of air quality changes into housing prices and how households may adjust their location preferences in response to the air quality changes. My primary estimates come from IV first difference models with lags between observations ranging from two to ten years. The range of lags enables examination of how the rate of capitalization and sorting behavior may change over time.
Further, this section details how housing units are matched with air quality monitors and the exact construction of the instrument.
The first and second stage equations of the first difference IV analysis are
and
where p ijt is the natural log of price (either house value or annual rent) of housing unit i matched to monitor j in time period t, PM ijt is the concentration of PM 10 for monitor j in time period t, and X ijt is a vector of unit and location covariates (a complete list of which appears in the Data Appendix). The instrument in Equation (1), N jt , is based on monitor non-attainment designation.
If in Equations (1) and (2), the first difference is taken between years t 1 and t 2 , then the monitor instrument equals the ratio of non-attainment years to the total number of years of observation during the years [t 1 , t 2 -1]. θ is the coefficient of interest and measures the change in log of house price due to a change in PM 10 , or the capitalization rate. Implicit in the first difference model is a unit specific fixed effect that absorbs time invariant characteristics of areas that might be correlated with house prices and air quality, such as climate and topographical features, proximity to open space, and transportation infrastructure.
In order to examine the dynamics of capitalization, I construct multiple first-difference datasets with varying time intervals between observations. Since the AHS surveys housing units every other year, I create datasets with two, four, six, eight, and ten years between observations.
For example, if a housing unit was surveyed in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995, this unit 1989-1991, 1991-1993, and 1993-1995 
First, I define y ijt to be binary and equal to one if unit i has turned over during the interval ending at t and zero otherwise. In this case, Equation (3) is estimated using a logistic model. Second, I
estimate models of sorting on observable characteristics that may be correlated with preferences for air quality: household head over the age of 65, the presence of children under 18, household head is either Black or Hispanic, educational attainment of the household head, and household income. For all characteristics except household income, y ijt is binary and equals one if the demographic characteristic of choice has "increased" (i.e., the household head of the prior occupants was under 65 and the household head of the new occupants is over 65) and equals zero if the demographic characteristic of choice has "decreased". 13 All unit-intervals that either do not experience turnover or do not have a change in the given demographic group are excluded. This restriction allows me to estimate (3) for this class of sorting models using a logistic model. For household income, y ijt equals the differenced log household income of the entering household from the exiting household, and the sample is still restricted to those units that turnover. Since y ijt is continuous in this case, Equation (3) is estimated using two stage least squares.
Much like housing prices, there are regional trends in turnover and demographics that must be taken into account in order to accurately measure preference-based sorting at a national scale. Unfortunately, no analogous CMHPI exists for demographic changes. As a second best, I
include changes in turnover and demographic characteristics at the MSA level (aggregated from 12 I choose not to interpolate PM10 values between monitors, so that the attainment designations can be clearly assigned at the monitor level. 13 The dependent variable for the educational attainment specification equals one if educational attainment has increased with the new occupants (i.e., a high school dropout moves out and either a high school graduate or university graduate moves in) and zero if educational attainment has declined. decennial census data) as covariates in the estimation of (3). 14 With this strategy, the locational choice of, for example, households over 65 in response to changes in PM 10 is conditional on the MSA level changes in the over 65 population.
CAPITALIZATION RESULTS
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the IV first difference model, presented in
Equations (1) and (2), for interval lengths of two, four, six, eight, and ten years for owneroccupied and renter-occupied units, respectively. 15 Consistent with expectations, the monitor non-attainment instrument performs well in predicting drops in particulate matter. Just focusing on 15 For the sake of comparison, the Online Appendix additionally reports results from cross-section and first difference (without instrumenting) models. The first difference results are qualitatively similar to those using an instrument, but the magnitudes of capitalization are much smaller reinforcing the importance of the IV strategy. 16 MWTP is defined as the amount a household would be willing to pay annually for a one unit reduction in PM 10 . For owners, this calculation requires an estimate of the annual cost of owning a home. I abstract from all costs except mortgage payments and assume an 8% interest rate and a 30-year mortgage. (8% is roughly in the middle of the range of mortgage rates observed during 1989-2001, according to historical rates downloaded from www.hsh.com/mtghst.html in May 2011.) For renters, the calculation is straightforward -just the estimated coefficient times the annual rent. 2000)). The between-interval variance in estimates is likely due to the volatility of prices in the owner market, and the "true" MWTP probably lies in the middle of the range. While there is variance in the estimates across intervals, there is no pattern of increasing or decreasing capitalization. Thus, the results suggest that owner-occupied units capitalize changes in air quality quickly.
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Switching to the second stage renter results, Table 3 demonstrates that, like owneroccupied units, rental units capitalize changes in air quality, but the pattern of capitalization is markedly different. For intervals two and four, coefficient estimates are small (-0.0021 and -0.0025) and statistically insignificant, but then sharply jump to a statistically significant -0.0076 for the six-year interval and continue all the way to -0.0203 at a lag of ten years. At a lag of two years, the elasticity is -0.06 and the MWTP is $13. At a lag of ten years, the elasticity and MWTP are ten times larger at levels of -0.63 and $161. Despite being initially low, elasticities for rental price responses reached parity with owners by the ten year interval.
Comparing the owner and renter results leads to counterintuitive insights. First, conventional wisdom may suggest that the renter market is better suited for valuation studies than the owner market because the high turnover rates and low financial costs of moving should cause prices to adjust quickly. However, the results indicate that the fluidity of a market does not correspond to the speed of capitalization. Second, the results suggest that the rental market and owner market are not as closely linked as conventional wisdom holds. The valuation sharply and immediately diverges, but there is no evidence that this divergence is arbitraged either through financial instruments or people delaying home purchase to rent. However, the maximum disparity in annual costs resulting from air quality improvements between homeowners and renters is $124, which may not be enough to induce arbitrage given the substantial economic and psychological costs of moving. 17 Another possibility is that households are forward-looking and, as a result, the two-year and perhaps the four-year capitalization coefficients are capturing households' expectations about future air quality improvements. Cellini et al. (2010) develop a forward looking estimator that delivers a larger estimated valuation for years shortly following the bond referendum compared to the more myopic estimators. Expectations are certainly possible in this setting, but given the IV framework it is infeasible to test for it. Tables 2 and 3 .
Robustness
Panel A in both tables examines whether the spatial distribution of owners and renters could affect the capitalization patterns. If the spatial distribution is uneven and different areas experience different appreciation rates, then comparisons between owners and renters could be flawed. For these estimates, the sample is restricted to air quality monitors that are matched to both owner-and renter-occupied units guaranteeing that the two groups have geographic overlap.
The results support the finding of immediate and constant capitalization for owners and delayed capitalization for renters.
Panel B in both tables tests for the possibility that pre-treatment trends could be affecting capitalization estimates. Each regression now includes the change in unit-specific log housing prices 1987-1989 as a control variable. Intuition would suggest that the short interval estimates would be more affected by pre-treatment trends than long interval coefficients. The two-and four-year interval estimates for owners are consistent with those in Table 2 , statistically significant at the 1% level, and remarkably stable. The two-and four-year interval estimates for renters are also consistent with those in Table 3 , showing small and insignificant capitalization.
Capitalization patterns for other intervals are consistent as well for both owners and renters.
One concern with the main results of Tables 2 and 3 is Tables 2 and 3. observations do not bias the short interval estimates. This finding is consistent with idea that the estimated local average treatment effect is most accurate for the treated sample, which in this case is the intervals experiencing the rapid PM 10 change (Imbens and Angrist 1994) .
Panel D of Table 4 examines capitalization for owner-occupied houses that do not turn over during an interval. 19 The purpose here is to check if information about sales prices percolates to households not taking part in that market. This is additionally important as a check on how self-reported prices follow those of units that do transact and can proxy for market prices. 20 The results again suggest immediate and full capitalization, as in Table 2 . In addition to validating self-reported prices and ubiquitous information, these results also suggest that households living in cleaned up areas that do not move still reap financial gains from the policy.
Panels D and E of Table 5 test whether price rigidities in the rental market could be causing the delay in capitalization. The concern is that landlords tend to keep rental prices nominally unchanged from year to year when tenants renew a lease, which has been shown to be the case by Genesove (2003) . Further, tenants in rent-controlled apartments tend to move less, and typically landlords can only modestly (if at all) adjust prices unless there is turnover. 21 Thus, only when tenants leave do landlords raise rents to market levels that would reflect a change in Table 3 , suggesting that delayed capitalization is common to all rental units, regardless of occupant tenure. In Panel E, the twoand four-year capitalization rates double compared to those seen in Table 3 , and the four-year coefficient is significant at the 5% level. However, the ten-year capitalization estimate is still five times larger than the two-year capitalization estimate. This suggests that rent control does impede some short term capitalization, but a lag in full capitalization still persists.
The last two panels of each table examine the robustness of results when the radius of match changes from three miles to two and four miles. The results of the two mile match model are qualitatively similar to the main results in Tables 2 and 3 , though there is less statistical 19 Though it would be a valuable test similar to using sales data, examining only units that sold is not feasible due to small sample size. 20 Kiel and Zabel (1999) examine bias stemming from self-reported prices and find that self-reported values tend to be inflated over market prices, but consistently so. Thus, as long as self-reported values are being compared to other self-reported values, the bias should not affect results. 21 This is especially important since rent control is practiced in Los Angeles (Los Angeles Housing Department 2012), which represents a substantial portion of the treatment group.
significance reflecting the decrease in sample size. The four mile match model is consistent with the main results, though the magnitude of the coefficients declines.
SORTING RESULTS
The delayed but sharply rising capitalization rates observed in the rental market offer an excellent opportunity to examine the relationship between valuation and preference-based sorting. 22 The capitalization results suggest that something fundamentally changes going from the two-and four-year interval to the six-, eight-, and ten-year intervals. If there is a relationship between sorting and valuation, a similar shift in the turnover rate or demographics should occur at the six-year interval. Table 6 presents the results from estimates of Equation (3), giving the second stage coefficients on PM 10 , as well as the implied marginal effects. 23 Panel A examines whether changes in PM 10 cause turnover to increase, and the model is estimated on the full sample appearing in Table 3 . A negative coefficient implies that a reduction in PM 10 increases the rate of turnover, which would be suggestive of preference-based sorting (with preferences potentially uncorrelated with observable characteristics). The estimated coefficients are positive and insignificant for intervals two and four. However, for intervals six and eight, the coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant. Further, the jump in the probability of turnover is economically significant; the total estimated increase in probability from four to six years given the total reductions in PM 10 is 10.1%. For interval ten, the coefficient is positive and insignificant again.
Panels B through F of Table 6 show the results of the sorting on observables analysis giving the estimates of the effects of PM 10 on demographic changes. A negative coefficient implies that a reduction in PM 10 increases the propensity of the given demographic group to move into rather than move out of that neighborhood. The results of Panel B suggest that 22 The possibility that appreciation in the owner market spills over into the renter market, perhaps at a substantial lag, could also explain the disparate capitalization paths. This is explored in the Online Appendix, but little support is found for this idea. However, there is evidence that owner prices aggregate both past owner and renter price changes, furthering the implication of the capitalization results that the owner market more efficiently incorporates information into prices than the renter market. Additionally in the Online Appendix, the corresponding owneroccupied sorting analysis is presented in. Given the relative infrequency of moves among owner-occupiers, the data is inadequate to draw too many conclusions. 23 Sample sizes and first stage results are omitted due to disclosure concerns. In all cases, the first stage estimates are similar in magnitude and significance with those shown in The results of the sorting analysis suggest that changes in turnover frequency and the location preferences of households with children are responsive to changes in air quality and correspond to the rental price capitalization patterns. Intuitively, households with children should value improvements in air quality more than households without children due to health concerns.
However, we might also think that preferences may be correlated with income and education, but the results show no evidence of this. To be clear, I am unable to disentangle the causality between price movements and locational preferences. The results only suggest that they are strongly related.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper uses rich housing market data and spatially disaggregated air quality data to examine changing housing prices and changing locational preferences in response to air quality changes brought on by differential regulatory pressure from the CAAA. This is the first paper to study the dynamic path of price capitalization in response to air quality changes and the first paper to examine the dynamics of capitalization in response to any changing amenity for owners and renters separately. The results strongly suggest a disconnect between air quality capitalization patterns in the owner and renter markets. While owner-occupied houses capitalize 24 Examining Black households and Hispanic household separately does not qualitatively affect the results.
changes immediately and the capitalization rate stays fairly constant over time, renter-occupied units are slow to capitalize changes, and the capitalization rate increases substantially over time up to the point that the implied MWTP estimates are on par for the two groups.
There are several reasons why the disparities in dynamic capitalization paths between owners and renters could exist. First, owners may be more attentive of amenity levels given their anticipated tenure and financial stake in the neighborhood. This effect may be especially strong for an imperfectly observed good such as air quality. Second, the structure of the rental market may be such that it impedes rapid price changes. This claim is partially implicated in Table 5 , which shows that short term capitalization rates increase when the sample excludes rental units that do not turn over or are subject to rent control. Third, if renters have heterogeneous preferences for air quality, changing locational preferences may lead to a lag of capitalization if households are slow to re-optimize their location (perhaps slow due to reasons one or two).
Surprisingly, the fact that there is so much less turnover in the owner market does not seem to affect the capitalization patterns.
This paper examines preference-based sorting and finds evidence that the turnover of rental units and the propensity for households with children move into a unit both increase in recently cleaned up neighborhoods. Importantly, the timing of the sorting coincides with price capitalization, both at a six year lag, bolstering the long-standing intuition of Tiebout's "vote with your feet" ideas.
Given that we do see an increase in the turnover rate, there may be a concern that renters suffer a welfare loss when air quality improves (e.g., Starrett 1981 , Sieg et al. 2004 , Grainger 2012 ). The fear is that when amenities improve, all of the new value goes to the owner, who can then charge higher rent leaving the tenants no better off -and potentially worse off if the renters cannot afford the new rent and must re-locate into an area with worse air quality. While the sorting results in this paper suggest there is an increase in turnover, the results also show that the new occupants are no wealthier or better educated or whiter than the previous tenants. 25 A full welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but at a minimum the results suggest that air quality improvements had an ambiguous welfare effect on renters.
While the results as a whole inform policy by offering more evidence that households value clean air, more importantly the results inform methods of policy evaluation. Price changes in the housing market are frequently used to valuate preferences, measure benefits, and assess damages. The owner results, suggesting immediate and full capitalization of an imperfectly observed amenity, are a testament of the efficacy of the hedonic approach. However, the renter results suggest that if the timeframe of analysis is insufficient, then the valuation could be severely underestimated. Specifically, in the case of the valuation of the significant air quality improvements in the 1990s, if the time frame of study was too short, then the estimates of MWTP could be as little as one quarter of the true valuation. Future work should continue to explore disparities in the owner and rental market in the response the amenity changes. , 1987-1989 -0.9 -3.9* -32.3* 2 -4
Notes: Each entry is the difference in means among units and occupants in the two groups given. Sample sizes are as follows: 1712 for in-sample owners, 17991 for out-of-sample owners, 1381 for in-sample renters, 7655 for out-of-sample renters, 1471 for in-attainment owners, 241 for non-attainment owners, 1139 for in-attainment renters, and 242 for non-attainment renters. * indicates a statistically significant difference of means at the 5% level. Notes: The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in annual PM10 concentrations, and the dependent variable in the second stage is the change in the natural log of house value. Each regression uses the full set of controls listed in the Data Appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in annual PM10 concentrations, and the dependent variable in the second stage is the change in the natural log of annual rent. Each regression uses the full set of controls listed in the Data Appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Table 2 , except for the sample. Sample sizes are censored to reduce disclosure risk. Panel A includes only monitors which are matched to both owner and renter units. Panel B includes the unit-specific change in the natural log of house value 1987-1989 as a covariate. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Table 3 , except for the sample. Sample sizes are censored to reduce disclosure risk. Panel A includes only monitors which are matched to both owner and renter units. Panel B includes the unit-specific change in the natural log of annual rent 1987-1989 as a covariate. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Notes: Each coefficient represents a different regression. Each specification includes all covariates listed in the data appendix. For Panel A, the sample is the same as in Table 3b , and the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if new occupants moved in to the unit at some point during the interval. For Panels B-F, samples include only unit-intervals that experienced turnover and where the demographic characteristic of choice changed. For Panels B-E, the dependent variable is binary and equals one if the unit gained in the given characteristic and equals zero if it lost. For example, if the out-moving occupant does not have children and the in-moving occupant does, then this would be coded as one. If both out-and in-moving occupants have children, then that unit-interval would be excluded from the sample. For Panel E, maximum educational attainment of all household heads is classified into high school dropout, high school graduate, and college graduate, and the dependent variable takes the value one if there is an increase in educational attainment along the lines of the three classifications (i.e., high school dropout moves out and high school grad moves in) and takes the value zero if educational attainment declines. The results shown in Panels A-E are estimated using an IV probit specification. Panel F is estimated using least squares, still in the IV first difference framework, as the dependent variable is continuous. Sample sizes are censored to reduce disclosure risk. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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